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Abstract
This paper introduces and analyses some models in the framework of Mean Field Games
describing interactions between two populations motivated by the studies on urban settle-
ments and residential choice by Thomas Schelling. For static games, a large population limit
is proved. For differential games with noise, the existence of solutions is established for the
systems of partial differential equations of Mean Field Game theory, in the stationary and
in the evolutive case. Numerical methods are proposed, with several simulations. In the
examples and in the numerical results, particular emphasis is put on the phenomenon of
segregation between the populations.
AMS-Subject Classification. 91A13, 49N70, 35K55
Keywords. Mean Field Games, multi-populations models, large populations limit, systems of parabolic equa-
tions, finite difference methods, segregation.
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1 Introduction
The theory of Mean Field Games (MFG, in short) is a branch of Dynamic Games which aims at
modeling and analyzing complex decision processes involving a large number of indistinguishable
rational agents who have individually a very small influence on the overall system and are, on
the other hand, influenced by the distribution of the other agents. It originated about ten years
ago in the independent work of J. M. Lasry and P.L. Lions, Ref. [41], and of M.Y. Huang, P. E.
Caines and R. Malhame´ Refs. [37], [36]. In the case of independent noises affecting the agents,
the main equations describing MFG are a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman parabolic equation for the
value function of the representative agent coupled with a Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation
for the density of the population, the former backward in time with a terminal condition and the
latter forward in time with an initial condition. Recently the theory and applications of MFG
have been growing very fast: we refer to P.-L. Lions’ courses on the site of the Colle`ge de France
http://www.college-de-france.fr/site/en-pierre-louis-lions/, the lecture notes Refs. [33] and [14],
and the books Refs. [12], [28], and [32]. A major recent breakthrough by Cardaliaguet, Delarue,
Lasry, and Lions is the solution of a PDE in the space of probablilty measures, called master
equation, which describes MFGs with a common noise affecting all players and allows to prove
general convergence results of N -person differential games to a MFG as N → ∞, in a suitable
sense.
The goal of this paper is to propose some models in the framework of Mean Field Games to
describe some kinds of interactions between two different populations, each formed by a large
number of indistinguishable agents. Such phenomena arise, for instance, in urban settlements,
ecosystems, pedestrian dynamics, see, e.g., Refs. [22], [10], and the references therein. We will
focus in particular on models of residential choice possibly leading to segregated neighborhoods.
We are inspired by the pioneering work of the Nobel Prize in Economics Thomas Schelling,
Refs. [44], [45], and some of its developments until recently, see, e.g., Refs. [47], [13], [9], [48],
[26], the survey [25], and the references therein. However, different from the sociologic and
economic literature where the models are usually discrete in space and time, we propose games
continuous in space and either static, for which we derive rigorously the large population limit, or
in continuous time, with the dynamics of each player described by a controlled system affected by
noise. In the differential game, the preferences of the players are described by a cost functional
integrated in time that each players seeks to minimise. We consider finite horizon problems as
well as games with long-time average cost (also called ergodic cost).
Our analytic results are on the existence of solutions to the system of the four PDEs associated
to the two-population MFG, with Neumann boundary conditions modelling the boundedness of
the city where the agents live. The PDEs are elliptic in the case of ergodic cost, with an additive
eigenvalue in each of the two H-J-B equations; the case of several populations was treated by the
second author and Feleqi with periodic boundary conditions (i.e., the state space of the agents
is a torus, Refs. [7], [23]), and by the third author with Neumann boundary conditions, Ref.
[20]. For finite horizon costs, the PDEs are parabolic (two backward and two forward in time)
and existence is known for a single population and periodic boundary conditions; we extend it to
two populations and Neumann conditions. Uniqueness of solutions holds for a single population
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under a restrictive monotonicity condition (Ref. [41]) and is not expected to hold for several
populations. In fact, we provide examples of non uniqueness by showing that the same game can
have segregated solutions as well as non-segregated ones, such as uniform distributions of both
populations.
One of the most interesting issues about these models is the qualitative behavior of solutions,
in particular whether two initially mixed population tend to segregate, i.e., to concentrate in
different parts of the city. Schelling’s most striking discovery was that very moderate preferences
for same-population neighbors at the individual level can lead to complete residential segregation
at the macro level. For example, if every agent requires at least half of her neighbors to belong to
the same population, and moves only if the percentage is below this threshold, the final outcome,
after a sequence of moves, is almost always complete segregation. Nowadays several softwares
freely available on the internet allow such simulations and show that segregation eventually
occurs, with random initial conditions, even with much milder thresholds, i.e., lower than 1/2,
see, e.g., NetLogo (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/). Thus Schelling’s conclusion was that
the “macrobehavior” in a society may not reflect the “micromotives” of its individual members
(Ref. [45]). His early experiments are considered today among the first prototypes of artificial
societies, see, e.g., Ref. [43].
We study the qualitative behavior of solutions by numerical methods. We use the techniques
introduced in MFG with a single population and periodic boundary conditions by the first author,
Capuzzo Dolcetta, and Camilli in Refs. [4], [2], and [3]. We present finite difference schemes for
the stationary PDEs associated to ergodic costs as well as for the evolutive backward-forward
system of the finite horizon problem. For both cases we show that segregation occurs with low
preference thresholds, so Schelling’s principle is valid also in our MFG models. We also compare
the results for different thresholds, showing that a higher threshold pushes a population to
concentrate in a smaller space, and we also observe the instability arising if both populations are
rather xenophobic, leading to oscillations in time. Finally we present a 2-d example of pedestrian
dynamics with two populations.
More references to the literature on MFG will be given throughout the paper.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we propose several forms of cost functionals
that reflect the preferences described by Schelling, with variants and generalizations. In Section
3, we prove a large population limit for the static game, following the method of Lions and
Cardaliaguet, Ref. [14], and give some simple examples of Mean Field equilibria. In Section
4, we first introduce a dynamics driven by a stochastic control system, the long-time average
cost, and the stationary MFG PDEs associated to them, followed by an example of coexistence
of segregated and non-segregated solutions. Then we describe the finite horizon problem, the
evolutive MFG PDEs for it, and prove an existence theorem. Section 5 illustrates the numerical
methods for the MFG PDEs. The final Section 6 contains several simulations for the stationary
and evolutive cases, in 1 and 2 dimensions.
2 Static games in continuous space inspired by T. Schelling
In this section, we propose a class of static (one-shot) games with two populations of players
whose positions are taken in a bounded set Ω ⊂ Rd. Within each population, all players have
the same cost functional to minimize. We choose such functionals in a way that reproduces the
main features of the classical models of segregated neighborhoods by Schelling, Ref. [44] and
[45], and of some of their subsequent developments. We fix a neighborhood U(x) for each point
x ∈ Ω and consider the amount of each population living in such neighborhood, N1(x), N2(x).
In the simplest models, the utility Uk (= minus the cost) of an individual of the k-th species
3
Figure 1: The utility function Uk (θk = 2, ak = 0.4).
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living at the position x depends only on the quantity
sk :=
Nk(x)
N1(x) +N2(x)
(1)
and has the shape shown in Figure 1, that is,
Uk(sk) :=
{
θk(sk − ak) if sk < ak,
0 else,
(2)
where θk > 0 and 0 ≤ ak ≤ 1. Here sk is the percentage of population k living in U(x) and ak is
a threshold of happiness: if sk is below it the player of the k-th species at the position x has a
negative utility, i.e., a positive cost.
In the Schelling’s model and in the differential games of Section 4, the agent then moves and
looks for a location with a higher value of sk, possibly sk > ak. In the static games of this
section, we look for equilibrium distributions of the players that are Nash equilibria for the game
of minimizing the individual costs. In most of the recent literature the parameter ak is taken to
be 1/2 for both populations, but in Schelling’s original examples it is often below 1/2, therefore
modeling populations that are not xenophobic and that just do not want that their own group
be too small in their neighborhood.
The shape of the utility function (2) is “peaked at ak”, as one of those considered in Ref.
[9] and a limit case of those in Ref. [47], [48]; for the slope θk very large it approximates the
stair-like utility of Schelling, and for ak = 1 it is the linear utility of Ref. [13]; see Ref. [25] for a
survey. References [47], [48], and [9] consider also utilities decreasing on the right of ak: although
we do not consider these cases in the numerical simulations, they satisfy the same boundedness
conditions as our models and therefore fit into our analysis of Sections 3, 4, and 5.
We will consider also more general cost functionals that depend on N1(x) and N2(x) sepa-
rately, not only via sk, and definitions of N1(x), N2(x) as measures of the number of individuals
weighted by the distance from x. Our assumptions will be general enough to include examples
in fields different from residential segregation, such as crowd motion and pedestrian dynamics,
see Ref. [22] for a general presentation and Ref. [38] and [39] for Mean-Field Games models with
two populations.
2.1 A basic game with two populations of N players.
We consider a one-shot game with 2N players divided in two populations. The vector (x1, . . . , xN )
represents the positions of the players of the first population and (y1, . . . , yN ) those of the players
of the second one, where xi, yi ∈ Ω and Ω ⊂ Rd is an open and bounded set. We adopt the
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conventions and notations of Mean-Field Games, see Ref. [41], and associate to each player a
cost (instead of a utility) that the player seeks to minimise (instead of maximise), it is denoted
with F 1,Ni for the i-th player of the first population and with F
2,N
i for the i-th player of the
second population. The first kind of cost functionals we propose are
F 1,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) =
θ1
(
]{xj ∈ U(xi) : j 6= i}
]{xj ∈ U(xi) : j 6= i}+ ]{yj ∈ U(xi)}+ η1(N − 1) − a1
)−
, (3)
where θ1 > 0, 0 ≤ a1 ≤ 1, η1 ≥ 0, ]X denotes the cardinality of the (finite) set X, U(x) is some
neighborhood of x (for example Br(x) ∩ Ω, where Br(x) is the ball centered at x of radius r, or
Sr(x)∩Ω, where Sr(x) is the square centered at x of side length r), and (t)− denotes the negative
part of t, i.e., (t)− = −t if t < 0 and (t)− = 0 if t ≥ 0. As before, a1 ∈ [0, 1] is the “threshold of
happiness” of any player of the first population: his cost is null if the ratio of the individuals of
his own kind in the neighborhood is above this threshold, whereas the cost is positive with slope
θ1 below the threshold. Note that, for η1 = 0 and U1, s1 defined by (2), (1),
F 1,Ni := −U1(s1), N1(x) = ]{xj ∈ U(xi) : j 6= i}, N2(x) = ]{yj ∈ U(xi)}.
In the following, however, we will assume η1 > 0 (and small) in order to avoid the indeterminacy
of the ratio s1 (1) as N1(x) + N2(x) → 0. This assumption makes the cost continuous, and it
has the following interpretation: suppose that a player is surrounded just by individuals of his
own kind, i.e. ]{yj ∈ U(xi)} = 0, then the cost he pays is null as long as
N1(x) = ]{xj ∈ U(xi) : j 6= i} ≥ a1η1
1− a1 (N − 1).
But if N1(x) becomes too small he pays a positive cost (tending to θ1a1 as N1(x) → 0). This
means that it is uncomfortable to live in an almost desert neighborhood.
We introduce the notation
G(r, s; a, t) :=
(
r
r + s+ t
− a
)−
, (4)
and observe that G : [0,+∞)× [0,+∞)× [0, 1]× (0, 1)→ [0,+∞) is a continuous and bounded
function of r, s for each a, t fixed. We rewrite
F 1,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN )
= θ1G(]{xj ∈ U(xi) : j 6= i}, ]{yj ∈ U(xi)}; a1, η1(N − 1)),
The cost for each player of the second population is
F 2,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN )
= θ2G(]{yj ∈ U(yi) : j 6= i}, ]{xj ∈ U(yi)}; a2, η2(N − 1)),
where a2 ∈ [0, 1] represents the threshold of happiness of this population and θ2, η2 > 0. It has
the same form as F 1,Ni , but the three parameters a2, θ2, η2 can be different from a1, θ1, η1.
We note that the costs depend on the position of the players only via the empirical measures
of the two populations. As usual in the theory of Mean-Field Games they can be generated by
maps over probability measures as follows
F 1,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) = V
1,N
 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=j
δxj ,
1
N
∑
δyj
 (xi), (5)
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where V 1,N : P(Ω)× P(Ω)→ C(Ω) is defined by
V 1,N [m1,m2](x) := θ1G
(
(N − 1)
∫
U(x)
m1, N
∫
U(x)
m2; a1, η1(N − 1)
)
, (6)
where P(Ω) denotes the set of all probability measures over Ω. In the same way,
F 2,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) = V
2,N
 1
N
∑
δxj ,
1
N − 1
∑
i6=j
δyj
 (yi)
= θ2G
(N − 1)∫
U(yi)
1
N − 1
∑
i6=j
δyj , N
∫
U(yi)
1
N
∑
δxj ; a2, η2(N − 1)
 . (7)
In the rest of the paper, we will assume
θ1 = θ2 = 1.
This is done merely for simplifying the notations, all the results and proofs of the paper remain
valid for any positive values of θk.
2.2 Overcrowding and family effects
In the discrete model of Schelling, there is a structural impossibility of overcrowding: every player
occupies a position in a chessboard, and every slot can host at most one player. In our continuous
model, there is no constraint on the local density and the individuals may even concentrate at a
single point of the domain. In order to avoid this unrealistic phenomenon, we shall introduce an
overcrowding term in the costs F k,Ni :
Fˆ 1,Ni (x1, . . . , yN ) = F
1,N
i + C1[(]{xj ∈ U(xi)}+ ]{yj ∈ U(xi)})/(2N)− b1]+,
Fˆ 2,Ni (x1, . . . , yN ) = F
2,N
i + C2[(]{xj ∈ U(yi)}+ ]{yj ∈ U(yi)})/(2N)− b2]+,
for every i = 1, . . . , N , so every player starts paying a positive cost when the total number of
players in his neighborhood overcomes the threshold bk2N ; thus bk ≥ 0 represents the maximum
percentage of the whole population that is tolerated at no cost. Here Ck are positive constants,
possibly large: when the concentration of players is too high in some regions, the discomfort
might be due to overcrowding and not necessarily to an unsatisfactory ratio between the total
number of individuals of the two populations (the F k,Ni term).
The maps over probability measures that generate these costs are
Vˆ 1[m1,m2](x) := V
1[m1,m2](x) + C1
[∫
U(x)
m1 +m2
2
− b1
]+
,
Vˆ 2[m1,m2](x) := V
2[m1,m2](x) + C2
[∫
U(x)
m1 +m2
2
− b2
]+
for the two populations.
Next we take into account that an individual may be influenced also by the opinions of other
individuals living around him. A first attempt to model this is adding to the cost of each player
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the costs paid by the players of his own kind and very close to him, e.g., by his family, leading to
F
1,N
i (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) =
1
N
∑
l : xl∈V(xi)
F 1,Nl (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ),
F
2,N
i (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) =
1
N
∑
l : yl∈V(yi)
F 2,Nl (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ),
where V(x) is a neighborhood of x in Ω. This can be refined by assuming that the opinion of
other neighbors is weighted by a function that depends upon the distance from the individual
F
k,N
i (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) =
1
N
N∑
l=1
F k,Nl (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN )W (xi, xl), (8)
k = 1, 2, where W : Ω × Ω → R is nonnegative and such that W (xi, ·) has support in V(xi).
Hence, combining (5) and (7) with (8), we arrive at
F
k,N
i (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) =
∫
Ω
W (xi, z)V
k,N (z)
1
N
N∑
l=1
δxl(dz), (9)
where
V 1,N (z) := V 1,N
 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=j
δxj ,
1
N
∑
δyj
 (z),
V 2,N (z) := V 2,N
 1
N
∑
δxj ,
1
N − 1
∑
i6=j
δyj
 (z).
2.3 More regular cost functionals
The cost functionals proposed so far involve the amount of individuals in a neighborhood of x
that can be written as ∫
U(x)
dmk(y) =
∫
Ω
χU(x)(y)dmk(y),
where mk is the empirical measure of the k-th population and χU(x)(·) is the indicator function
of the set U(x), i.e., χU(x)(y) = 1 if y ∈ U(x) and χU(x)(y) = 0 otherwise. It is useful to consider
regularized versions of such integrals where χU(x)(x, y) is approximated by a nonnegative smooth
kernel K(·, ·) such that K(x, y) = 1 if y ∈ U(x) and K(x, y) = 0 for y out of a small neighborhood
of U(x). The cost functionals of Section 2.1 are modified to
V 1,N [m1,m2] (x) :=
G
(
(N − 1)
∫
Ω
K(x, y)dm1(y), N
∫
Ω
K(x, y)dm2(y); a1, η1(N − 1)
)
, (10)
V 2,N [m1,m2] (x) :=
G
(
(N − 1)
∫
Ω
K(x, y)dm2(y), N
∫
Ω
K(x, y)dm1(y); a2, η2(N − 1)
)
. (11)
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As we will see in the next section, these new functionals are continuous on P(Ω) endowed with
a suitable notion of distance between measures.
In the present continuous-space setting, they are also more realistic, because individuals near
the boundary of U(x) still count in the cost but with small weights. More generally, K can be a
suitable decreasing function of the distance between x and y.
3 Static Mean-Field Games with two populations
In this section, we derive a pair of equations in P(Ω) that describe the one-shot Mean-Field
Game with two populations of players. They are obtained by taking the limit as N → ∞
of Nash equilibria in the game with N + N players. They are the natural extension to two
populations of the equation proposed by Lions for a single population in his lectures at the
College de France, see Ref. [14].
In the sequel, we consider P(Ω) as a metric space with the Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance1
between two measures µ, ν that we denote with d(µ, ν), whose topology corresponds to the weak∗
convergence of measures (see, e.g., Ref. [14]).
3.1 The large populations limit
Let F 1,N1 , . . . , F
1,N
N , F
2,N
1 , . . . , F
2,N
N : Ω
2N → R be the cost functions of a game with two popu-
lations of N players each. Suppose that there exist continuous V 1, V 2 : P(Ω) × P(Ω) → C(Ω)
such that, for all N and i = 1, . . . , N ,
F 1,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) = V
1
 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=j
δxj ,
1
N
∑
δyj
 (xi) + o(1) (12)
F 2,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) = V
2
 1
N
∑
δxj ,
1
N − 1
∑
i6=j
δyj
 (yi) + o(1), (13)
where o(1)→ 0 as N →∞ uniformly with respect to xi, yj .
For (x¯N1 , . . . , x¯
N
N , y¯
N
1 , . . . , y¯
N
N ) ∈ Ω
2N
, denote the empirical measures with
m¯N1 :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
δx¯Nj , m¯
N
2 :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
δy¯Nj .
The next result is the large population limit of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1. Assume (12), (13), and that, for all N , (x¯N1 , . . . , x¯
N
N , y¯
N
1 , . . . , y¯
N
N ) is a Nash
equilibrium for the game with cost functions F 1,N1 , . . . , F
1,N
N , F
2,N
1 , . . . , F
2,N
N . Then, up to sub-
sequences, the sequences of measures (m¯N1 ), (m¯
N
2 ) converge, respectively, to m¯1, m¯2 ∈ P(Ω) such
that ∫
Ω
V k[m¯1, m¯2](x)dm¯k(x) = inf
µ∈P(Ω)
∫
Ω
V k[m¯1, m¯2](x)dµ(x), k = 1, 2. (14)
1We recall that d(µ, ν) = sup
{∫
Ω φ(x)(µ− ν)(dx) |φ : Ω→ R is 1-Lipschitz continuous
}
.
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Proof. By compactness, m¯Nk → mk as N →∞ (up to subsequences); we need to prove that m¯k
satisfy (14). Let  > 0, for all N ≥ N¯ = N¯() we have that for all z ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . , N ,
V 1
 1
N − 1
∑
i6=j
δx¯Nj ,
1
N
∑
δy¯Nj
 (x¯Ni ) ≤ V 1
 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=j
δx¯Nj ,
1
N
∑
δy¯Nj
 (z) + 
by definition of Nash equilibrium and (12), so the measure δx¯Ni satisfies for all µ ∈ P(Ω)
∫
Ω
V 1
 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δx¯Nj ,
1
N
∑
j
δy¯Nj
 (x)dδx¯Ni (x) ≤
∫
Ω
V 1
 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δx¯Nj ,
1
N
∑
j
δy¯Nj
 (x)dµ(x) + .
Since d
(
1
N−1
∑
j 6=i δx¯Nj , m¯
N
1
)
→ 0, by continuity of V 1∣∣∣∣∣∣V 1
 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δx¯Nj ,
1
N
∑
j
δy¯Nj
 (x)− V 1[m¯N1 , m¯N2 ](x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
for all x ∈ Ω and N ≥ N¯ , so∫
Ω
V 1[m¯N1 , m¯
N
2 ](x)dδx¯Ni (x) ≤
∫
Ω
V 1[m¯N1 , m¯
N
2 ](x)dµ(x) + 3.
Then we take the sum for i = 1, . . . , N and the infµ, divide by N and get∫
Ω
V 1[m¯N1 , m¯
N
2 ](x)dm¯
N
1 (x) ≤ inf
µ∈P(Ω)
∫
Ω
V 1[m¯N1 , m¯
N
2 ](x)dµ(x) + 3.
Using again that continuity of V 1, by passing to the limit as N →∞ and then → 0 we obtain
(14) for k = 1. The argument for k = 2 is analogous, by using (13) instead of (12).
Remark 2. The two equations (14) define a Mean-Field equilibrium (m¯1, m¯2) for any game with
two populations associated to the functionals V 1, V 2. They are easily seen to be equivalent to
the equations
∀x ∈ supp m¯k V k[m¯1, m¯2](x) = min
z∈Ω
V k[m¯1, m¯2](z), k = 1, 2, (15)
see Ref. [14], Section 2.2, for the case of a single population.
Remark 3. The assumption of existence of a Nash equilibrium for the N + N game in the
previous theorem may look restrictive because Nash equilibria may not exist without further
assumptions. However, the classical Nash Theorem guarantees that Nash equilibria exist if we
allow players to use mixed strategies, i.e., to minimise over elements of P(Ω). Moreover, all players
of the same population use the same cost function, so one can consider Nash equilibria in mixed
strategies that are symmetric within each population, as in Section 8 of Ref. [14]. Then one
can derive the equations (14) and (15) via the large population limit by assuming (x,m1,m2) 7→
V k[m1,m2](x) both Lipschitz continuous, but not the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, following Section 2.3 of Ref. [14].
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3.2 Examples
Here we show that the models of Section 2 satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 1 or Remark
3 as soon as the the amount of players in a neighborhood is regularized as in Section 2.3. This
is based on the next simple result.
Lemma 4. If K : Rd × Rd → R is Lipschitz continuous, then the map Ω × P(Ω) → Rd,
(x,m) 7→ ∫
Ω
K(x, y)dm(y) is Lipschitz continuous.
Proof. The Lipschitz continuity in x is immediate. For the Lipschitz continuity in m we observe
that, if L is a Lipschitz constant for K(x, ·), then y 7→ K(x, y)/L has Lipschitz constant 1, so by
the very definition of Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
K(x, y)d(m(y)− µ(y))
∣∣∣∣ = L ∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
K(x, y)
L
d(m(y)− µ(y))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Ld(m,µ).
Example 5 (The basic game). We consider the game with N +N players and cost functions
F 1,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) = V
1,N
 1
N − 1
∑
i6=j
δxj ,
1
N
∑
δyj
 (xi),
F 2,Ni (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) = V
2,N
 1
N
∑
j
δxj ,
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δyj
 (yi),
where V k,N are the regularized functionals (10) and (11) with K ≥ 0 and Lipschitz, and G is
defined by (4). Since G(γr, γs; a, t) = G(r, s; a, γ−1t) for all γ 6= 0,
V k,N [m1,m2] (x) = G
(∫
Ω
K(x, y)dmk(y),
N
N − 1
∫
Ω
K(x, y)dm−k(y); ak, ηk
)
.
Moreover, for ηi > 0, G is Lipschitz continuous in the first two entries, so we can pass to the
limit as N →∞ and get (12) and (13) with
V k [m1,m2] (x) := G
(∫
Ω
K(x, y)dmk(y),
∫
Ω
K(x, y)dm−k(y); ak, ηk
)
, (16)
where m−1 = m2 and m−2 = m1. Furthermore, (x,m1,m2) 7→ V k[m1,m2](x) are Lipschitz
continuous by Lemma 4. Then Proposition 1 applies to this example if there are Nash equilibria
in pure strategies for the N +N game, and in general Remark 3 applies.
Example 6 (Games with family effects). Here we take the cost functionals with “family ef-
fects” of Section 2.2 and we regularize them as in Section 2.3, i.e., V k,N (x) are the regularized
functionals (10) and (11) as in the preceding example and we consider
F
k,N
i (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) =
1
N
N∑
l=1
V k,N (xl)W (xi, xl), (17)
where W : Rd × Rd → R is Lipschitz continuous. In this case, (12) and (13) are satisfied by
V
k
[m1,m2](x) :=
∫
Ω
W (x, z)V k[m1,m2](z)dmk(z) (18)
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and (x,m1,m2) 7→ V k[m1,m2](x) are Lipschitz continuous as in the previous example.
Note that the functionals V k and V
k
have a remarkably different behavior in areas where
both populations are rare. In fact, assume that at some point x¯ both
∫
Ω
K(x¯, y)dmk(y) = 0 and,
e.g,
∫
Ω
W (x¯, z)dm1(z) = 0. Then
V 1[m1,m2](x¯) = a1 = maxG, V
1
[m1,m2](x¯) = 0 = minG.
3.3 Some explicit Mean-Field equilibria
In this section, we give two simple examples of pairs (m¯1, m¯2) ∈ P(Ω) × P(Ω) that satisfy the
Mean-Field equations (15) (or, equivalently, (14)) for the basic game of Example 5.
Example 7 (Uniform distributions). In addition to the assumptions of Example 5, suppose that∫
Ω
K(x, y) dy = c does not depend on x. (19)
This says that the kernel K gives the same total weight to the neighborhood U(x) := suppK(x, ·)
of x, for all x ∈ Ω. Consider the uniform distributions
m¯1(x) = m¯2(x) = 1/|Ω| ∀x ∈ Ω,
where |Ω| denotes the measure of Ω. Observe that, by (19), V k[m¯1, m¯2](x) is constant. Then
the pair (m¯1, m¯2) solves (15) and therefore it is a Mean-Field equilibrium. Note that this occurs
for all values of the parameters ak, ηk, and that the “value of the game” V
k[m¯1, m¯2](x) is not
necessarily 0 (e.g., for ak ≥ 1/2, ηk > 0).
Example 8 (Fully segregated solutions). In addition to the assumptions of Example 5, we
suppose now that, for some r > 0,
suppK(x, ·) ⊆ {z : |z − x| ≤ r} (20)
and a1, a2 < 1. We consider two sets Ω1,Ω2 ⊆ Ω such that
dist(Ω1,Ω2) ≥ r,
∫
Ωk
K(x, y) dy ≥ ck > 0 ∀x ∈ Ωk, k = 1, 2.
The second condition means that Ωk has enough weight near x for all x ∈ Ωk. We consider the
distributions
m¯1(x) =
{
1/|Ω1| if x ∈ Ω1,
0 else,
m¯2(x) =
{
1/|Ω2| if x ∈ Ω2,
0 else.
(21)
In order to check (15), we first pick x ∈ supp m¯1 = Ω1. By (20) and the first property of Ωk we
have ∫
Ω
K(x, y) dm¯1(y)∫
Ω
K(x, y) dm¯1(y) +
∫
Ω
K(x, y) dm¯2(y) + η1
= 1/
(
1 +
η1|Ω1|∫
Ω1
K(x, y) dy
)
,
and the right-hand side is above or equal to the threshold a1 if and only if
η1|Ω1| ≤
∫
Ω1
K(x, y) dy
(
1
a1
− 1
)
,
which is true for all x ∈ Ω1 if
η1|Ω1| a1
1− a1 ≤ c1.
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Then for such values of the parameters V 1[m¯1, m¯2](x) = 0, so the first equation (15) is satisfied.
Similarly, if η2|Ω2|a2/(1− a2) ≤ c2, for x ∈ supp m¯2 = Ω2 we have V 2[m¯1, m¯2](x) = 0 and also
the second equation (15) is verified. Therefore we have a large set of parameters for which any
segregated solution of the form (21) is a Mean-Field equilibrium.
3.4 Models with myopic players
In connection with the differential Mean-Field games of the next sections, it is interesting to
consider models where the cost functionals V k[m1,m2](x) depend only on (m1(x),m2(x)). This
makes sense only if the measures mk have a density, and it is a limit case that does not meet
the regularity conditions of Section 3.1. We derive such local versions of the cost functionals
by letting the size of the neighborhoods U(x) tend to 0. This corresponds to individuals who
compute their cost functional by looking only at a very short distance, that we call myopic
players.
Suppose that the kernel K in Section 2.3 takes the form
K(x, y) = ρ−dϕ
(
x− y
ρ
)
where ϕ is a mollifier (i.e., a smooth nonnegative function Rd → R with support the unit ball
centered at 0 and
∫
Rd ϕ(z)dz = 1). If m ∈ L1(Ω), limρ→0
∫
K(x, y)dm(y) = m(x) for a.e. x.
Consider first the functionals V k associated to the basic game (in the large population limit)
defined by (16) in Example 5. Then
lim
ρ→0
V k[m1,m2](x) = G(mk(x),m−k(x); ak, ηk)
=
(
mk(x)
mk(x) +m−k(x) + ηk
− ak
)−
=: V k` [m1,m2](x).
Next we consider the game with family effects of Example 6 and assume the kernel W in (18)
is also of the form
W (x, y) = r−dψ
(
x− y
r
)
where ψ is a mollifier. In the functionals V
k
defined by (18), we let first r → 0 and get
lim
r→0
V
k
[m1,m2](x) = mk(x)V
k[m1,m2](x).
This a partially local model that can be interesting in some cases, but we do not study it further
in this paper. Finally, we let ρ→ 0 and obtain the local version of V k:
lim
ρ→0
lim
r→0
V
k
[m1,m2](x) = mk(x)V
k
` [m1,m2](x) =: V`
k
[m1,m2](x).
4 Mean-field differential game models of segregation
4.1 Long-time average cost functionals
In the last section, we designed some one-shot mean field games inspired by the original ideas
of the population model by T. Schelling. We obtained the averaged costs V k, V
k
by taking the
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limits as N → ∞ of Nash equilibria of one-shot games with 2N players, and then the local
limits V k` , V
k
` by shrinking the neighborhoods to points. We shall now investigate dynamic mean
field games with the same cost functionals in a differential context. We consider the state of
a representative agent of the k-th population governed by the controlled stochastic differential
equation with reflection
dXks = α
k
sds+
√
2ν dBks − n(Xks )dlks , (22)
where Bks is a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion defined on some probability space, α
k
s
is a control process adapted to Bks , n(x) is the outward normal to the open set Ω at the point
x ∈ ∂Ω, and the local time lks =
∫ s
0
χ∂Ω(X
k
s )dl
k
s is a non-decreasing process adapted to B
k
s . The
term n(Xks )dl
k
s in the stochastic differential equation prevents the state variable X
k
s to escape
from Ω by reflecting it when it reaches the boundary.
The goal of a player of the k-th population is minimizing the long-time average cost, also
called ergodic cost,
Jk(Xk0 , α
1, α2,m1,m2) = lim inf
T→+∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
L(Xks , α
k
s ) + V
k[m1,m2](X
k
s )ds
]
, (23)
where mk are the distributions of the two populations and L is a Lagrangian function (smooth
and convex in its second entry) which represents the cost paid by the player for using the control
αks at the position X
k
s .
The equilibrium distributions mk satisfy, together with λk ∈ R and the functions uk, the
stationary MFG system of two Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and two Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck
equations  −ν∆uk +H(x,Duk) + λk = V
k[m1,m2](x) in Ω, k = 1, 2
−ν∆mk − div(DpH(x,Duk)mk) = 0,
∂nuk = 0, ν∂nmk +mkDpH
k(x,Duk)) · n = 0, on ∂Ω,
(24)
where the Hamiltonian H is the Legendre transform of L with respect to the 2nd entry, λk is
the (constant) value of the representative agent of the k-th population, and the solutions uk of
the H-J-B equations provide the optimal strategies in feedback form −DpH(·, Duk(·)). Here the
costs V k might be replaced by V
k
or by the local versions V k` and V
k
` defined in the previous
section. The connection between systems like (24) and stochastic differential games with N
players having the same dynamics and individual costs, as N →∞, was discovered by Lasry and
Lions Ref. [41] in the periodic setting for a single population, and extended to several populations
and more general data in Ref. [23] and to Linear-Quadratic problems in Ref. [8], see also Ref.
[37] for related results by different methods.
Existence for (24) can be proved by means of fixed-point arguments when the cost functionals
are bounded.
Theorem 9. Let Ω be a convex domain. Suppose that H(x, p) = R|p|γ−H0(x), where R > 0, γ >
1, H0 ∈ C2(Ω) and ∂nH0 ≥ 0 on ∂Ω. Then, there exists at least one solution (uk, λk,mk) ∈
C1,δ(Ω)× R×W 1,p(Ω) to (24) with costs either V k, or V k, or V k` , k = 1, 2.
Proof. See Ref. [20], Theorem 6.
The case of local costs V
k
` in dimension d > 1 does not fit into the existence theorem because
V
k
` is unbounded and a-priori estimates on solutions might fail in general. For space dimension
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d = 1 see Ref. [19], Proposition 4.6. We do not expect uniqueness of the solution to the system
(24).
For non-local V k, V
k
solutions can be proved to be classical and existence holds under weaker
assumptions (see Theorem 4 in Ref. [20]), provided the negative part (·)− inG is replaced by some
smooth regularization. We are interested in qualitative properties of m1,m2, but no methods
in this direction are known so far for solutions of PDE systems like (24). For such a reason, a
numerical analysis will be carried out in Section 6.
4.1.1 The deterministic case in one space dimension
In order to convince ourselves that segregation phenomena might occur also in our differential
MFG models, we briefly analyze the deterministic case ν = 0 in space dimension d = 1. Suppose
that the state space is a closed interval Ω = [a, b] ⊂ R and that there is no Brownian motion
perturbing the dynamics of the average players (ν = 0). Suppose also that H(x, p) = |p|2/2.
Then, (24) simplifies to
(u′k)
2
2 + λk = V
k[m1,m2](x) in Ω, k = 1, 2
(u′kmk)
′ = 0,
u′k = 0, u
′
kmk = 0 on ∂Ω,
(25)
where the Neumann boundary conditions must be interpreted in the viscosity sense, as it is
natural when taking the limit as ν → 0.
It is possible to construct explicit solutions for this system. For simplicity, we will consider
the non-smoothened costs
V k[m1,m2](x) = G
(∫
U(x)
mk,
∫
U(x)
m−k; ak, ηk
)
,
where G is defined in (4) and m−1 = m2,m−2 = m1.
Example 10 (Uniform distributions).
mk =
1
b− a, uk = 0, λk = V
k[m1,m2], k = 1, 2
provides a solution: the two populations are distributed uniformly and the cost functions are
everywhere zero if the two thresholds ak are not large (say, below .5 if η is negligible).
Example 11 (Segregated solutions). A family of fully segregated solutions may be written down
explicitly. Suppose that U(x) = (x − r, x + r) ∩ [a, b] with r > 0 small, and let a = x0 < x1 <
x2 < x3 < x4 < x5 = b such that xk+1 − xk > r for k = 0, . . . , 4. Set
m1(x) =
1
x2 − x1χ[x1,x2](x), m2(x) =
1
x4 − x3χ[x3,x4](x) ∀x ∈ [a, b].
Then,
∫
U(x)m1 and
∫
U(x)m2 are continuous functions which have support in (x1− r, x2 + r) and
(x3 − r, x4 + r), respectively. V 1[m1,m2](·) is also continuous, and vanishes in [x1, x2] (if a1 < 1
and η1 is small enough); indeed,
∫
U(x)m2 = 0, so
∫
U(x)m1/
∫
U(x)(m1 +m2) = 1. The same is for
V 2, so we define
λk = 0, uk(x) =
∫ x
a
(2V k[m1,m2](σ))
1/2dσ, ∀x ∈ [a, b], k = 1, 2.
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It is easy to see that the functions (u1, u2) verify the two HJB equations of (25). Moreover, they
satisfy the Neumann boundary conditions u′k(a) = u
′
k(b) = 0 in the viscosity sense
2 (but not in
classical sense, as (u′k)
2 = 2V k 6= 0 on the boundary of [a, b]); indeed, suppose that φ is a test
function such that u1 − φ has a local maximum at x = b. If we set s = (2V 1[m1,m2](b))1/2 it
follows that φ′(b) ≤ s. If φ′(b) ≥ −s then (φ′(b))2 ≤ s2, so
min{(φ′(b))2 − 2V 1[m1,m2](b), φ′(b)} ≤ 0.
Similarly, if u1 − φ has a local minimum at x = b,
max{(φ′(b))2 − 2V 1[m1,m2](b), φ′(b)} ≥ 0,
and in the same way it also holds that u′1(a) = u
′
2(a) = u
′
2(b) = 0 in the viscosity sense.
It remains to check that mk are (weak) solutions of the two Kolmogorov equations. To do
so, we notice that m1 is zero outside [x1, x2]; in [x1, x2], however, V
1[m1,m2](x) = 0, hence
u′1(x) = 0. Similarly, m2(x) or u
′
2(x) vanishes, so (u
′
kmk)
′ = 0.
4.2 Finite horizon problems
When the the cost paid by a single player has the form (23), which captures the effect of the mk
long-time average, the mean field system of partial differential equations (24) which characterizes
Nash equilibria is stationary, i.e. no time dependance appears. Suppose, on the other hand, that
a time horizon T > 0 is fixed, and the cost paid by the average player of the k-th population is
of the form
Jk(Xk0 , t, α
1, α2,m1,m2) = E
[∫ T
t
L(x, αks ) + V
k[m1,m2](X
k
s )ds+G
k
T [m(T )](X
k
T )
]
, (26)
where t is the initial time and GkT [m(T )] represents the cost paid at the final time T . Then, the
time variable t enters the Mean Field Game system, which becomes
−∂tuk − ν∆uk +Hk(x,Duk) = V k[m](x), in Ω× (0, T ),
∂tmk − ν∆mk − div(DpHk(x,Duk)mk) = 0 in Ω× (0, T ),
∂nuk = 0, ν∂nmk +mkDpH
k(x,Duk) · n = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
uk(x, T ) = G
k
T [m(T )](x), mk(x, 0) = mk,0(x) in Ω
(27)
We observe that (27) has a backward-forward structure: the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
for the value functions V k is backward in time, being the representative agent able to foresee the
outcome of his actions, while his own distribution mk evolves forward in time. The final cost G
k
T
and the initial distributions mk,0 are prescribed as final/initial boundary data.
For one population with periodic boundary conditions, the rigorous derivation of such a
system from Nash equilibria of 2N -persons games in the limits as N → ∞ was proved very
recently in the fundamental paper by Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry, and Lions Ref. [15] on the
so-called Master Equation of MFG. For related results by probabilistic methods, see Ref. [24]
and the references therein. The fact that from a solution of (27) one can synthesize -Nash
equilibria for the 2N -persons game, if N is large enough, is due to Huang, Caines and Malhame´
Ref. [37] (for one population) and to Nourian and Caines for problems with major an minor
agents, Ref. [42].
2A function u ∈ C([a, b]) satisfies the homogeneous Neumann boundary conditions in the viscosity sense
in a if, for all test functions φ ∈ C2 such that u − φ has a local maximum at a, then min{(φ′(a))2 −
2V 1[m1,m2](a), φ′(a)} ≤ 0, and for all φ ∈ C2 such that u− φ has a local minimum at a, then max{(φ′(a))2 −
2V 1[m1,m2](a), φ′(a)} ≥ 0.
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We also point out that the system (24) captures in some circumstances the behavior of (27)
as T → ∞. In particular, for a single population, if the cost V is monotone increasing with
respect to m, then solutions of (27) converge to solutions of (24) (see Ref. [16]). It is not clear
whether a similar phenomenon can be rigorously proved in our multi-population systems, since
monotonicity fails, but we show in Section 6 that it is likely to occur by providing some numerical
evidences.
Existence of classical solutions for non-stationary Mean Field Games systems like (27) can be
stated under rather general assumptions. In Ref. [14] a detailed proof is provided for the single-
population case with periodic boundary conditions. Next we state a precise existence result
for our system (27) and outline its proof, whose main modifications are due to the presence of
Neumann boundary conditions. Nevertheless, the general lines of the argument are the same:
the fixed point structure of the system is exploited and the regularizing assumptions on V k, GkT
assure that suitable a-priori estimates hold.
We recall that the space of probability measures P(Ω) can be endowed with the Kantorovitch-
Rubinstein distance, which metricize the weak∗ topology on P(Ω). The assumptions on V k, GkT ,
mi,0 we require are
1. V k, GkT are continuous in Ω× P(Ω)2.
2. V k[m], GkT [m] are bounded respectively in C
1,β(Ω), C2,β(Ω) for some β > 1, uniformly with
respect to m ∈ P(Ω)2.
3. Hk ∈ C1(Ω× Rd) and it satisfies for some C0 > 0 the growth condition
DpH
k(x, p) · p ≥ −C0(1 + |p|2).
4. mi,0 ∈ C2,β(Ω).
5. The following compatibility conditions are satisfied:
∂nG
k
T [m(T )](x) = 0, ∀m ∈ P(Ω)2, x ∈ ∂Ω,
∂nmi,0(x) +mi,0DpH
k(x,Duk(x)) · n = 0 on ∂Ω.
The assumptions (1) and (2) are satisfied by the non-local costs V k, V k defined by (16) and (18)
in Section 3.2 if the negative part function (·)− in G is replaced by a smooth approximation 3.
Theorem 12. Under the assumptions listed above there exists at least one classical solution to
(27).
Proof. Step 1. We start by an estimate on the Fokker-Planck equation. Suppose that b is a given
vector field, continuous in time and Ho¨lder continuous in space (on Ω), and m ∈ L1(Ω× (0, T ))
solves in the weak sense ∂tm− ν∆m+ div(bm) = 0 in Ω× (0, T ),ν∂nm(x)−mb · n = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in Ω.
(28)
Then, m(t) is the law of the following stochastic differential equation with reflection
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
b(Xs, s)ds+
√
2νBt −
∫ t
0
n(Xs)dls Xt ∈ Ω
lt =
∫ t
0
χ∂Ω(Xs)dls
l(0) = 0 l is nondecreasing,
(29)
3For example, ϕ(t) =
1
2
(
√
t2 + 2 − t),  > 0 small, or Ψ−,(·) as in (42).
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where Bt is a standard Brownian motion over some probability space, Xt, lt (the so-called local
time) are continuous processes adapted to Bt and the law of X0 is m0. This can be verified by
exploiting the results of Ref. [46], where it is proved that for all ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that ∂nϕ = 0
on ∂Ω,
Mt := ϕ(Xt)−
∫ t
0
[ν∆ϕ(Xt) + b(Xt, t) ·Dϕ(Xt)]dt (30)
is a martingale with respect to Bt. As a consequence, taking expectations in (30) shows that the
law of Xt is the (unique) solution of (28).
This kind of stochastic interpretation of (28) allows us to derive the following estimate:
d(m(t),m(s)) = sup
{∫
Ω
φ(x)(m(x, t)−m(x, s))dx : φ is 1-Lipschitz continuous
}
≤ sup {Ex|φ(Xt)− φ(Xs)| : φ is 1-Lipschitz continuous} ≤ Ex|Xt −Xs|
≤ Ex
[∫ t
s
|b(Xτ , τ)dτ |+
√
2ν|Bt −Bs|
]
,
for all s, t ∈ [0, T ], where the last inequality follows from Ref. [6]. We can then conclude that
d(m(t),m(s)) ≤ c0(1 + ‖b‖∞)|t− s| 12 (31)
for some c0 which does not depend on t, s.
Step 2. We set up now the existence argument, which is based on a fixed-point method. Let
C be the set of maps µ ∈ C0([0, T ],P(Ω)) such that
sup
s 6=t
d(µ(s), µ(t))
|t− s|1/2 ≤ C1, (32)
for a constant C1 large enough that will be chosen subsequently. The set C is convex and compact.
To any (µ1, µ2) ∈ C2 we associate the (unique) classical solution (u1, u2) of
−∂tuk − ν∆uk +Hk(x,Duk) = V k[µ1, µ2](x), (33)
satisfying the Neumann boundary conditions ∂nuk = 0 on ∂Ω, and then define m = (m1,m2) =
Ψ(µ) as the solutions of the two Fokker-Planck equations
∂tmk − ν∆mk − div(DpHk(x,Duk)mk) = 0. (34)
A fixed point of Ψ is clearly a solution of (27). Such a mapping is indeed well-defined: existence
for the HJB equation (33) is guaranteed by Theorem 7.4, p. 491 of Ref. [40] and the well-
posedness of (34) is stated in Theorem 5.3, p. 320 of Ref. [40]. These results incorporate also
the Schauder a-priori estimates, that together with (31) make Ψ continuous and a mapping from
C2 into itself, provided that the constant C1 in (32) is large enough. The existence of a fixed
point for Ψ follows from the application of the Schauder fixed point theorem.
While existence of smooth solutions of (27) with costs V k, V k can be established through
standard methods, the local versions V k` , V
k
` are not regularizing, so the ideas of Theorem 12
cannot be applied directly; in this case, existence of solutions is a much more delicate issue.
A well-established workaround is to smoothen the costs by convolution with kernels, and
pass to the limit in a sequence of approximating solutions (which are obtained by arguing as in
Theorem 12); this procedure requires a-priori bounds, that strongly depend on the behavior of
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the Hamiltonian at infinity, the cost, and the space dimension d. It is not the purpose of this
paper to present theoretical results on existence of smooth solutions in full generality. We believe
that, under suitable assumptions, solutions can be obtained without substantial difficulties by
extending known results for one-population MFG on the torus to the case of two populations
with Neumann boundary conditions. Next we briefly explain how.
Suppose that Hk(x, p) behaves like c|p|γ as p → ∞ (c > 0, and γ > 1). In our setting, the
couplings V k` , V
k
` are non-negative, and a-priori bounds on
∫ |Duk|γmk dxdt and ∫ V k` mk dxdt
(quantities that are somehow related to the energy of the system) can be easily proved. To carry
out the approximation procedure, it is crucial to have a-priori bounds on ‖mk‖L∞(Ω).
Example 13. In the purely quadratic case, namely, Hk(x, p) = |p|2/2, the Hopf-Cole transfor-
mation can be used to transform (27) into a system of two couples of semilinear equations of the
form {
−∂tφk − ν∆φk + 12νV k` (φ1ψ1, φ2ψ2)φk = 0,
∂tψk − ν∆ψk + 12νV k` (φ1ψ1, φ2ψ2)ψk = 0,
where φk = e
−uk/2ν and ψk = mkeuk/2ν , with the corresponding initial-final data and Neumann
boundary conditions. Bounds on ‖mk‖L∞(Ω) = ‖φkψk‖L∞(Ω) can be derived by arguing as in
Ref. [16], where a Moser iteration method is implemented.
Example 14. If 1 < γ < 1+1/(d+1), so that H grows almost linearly, it is known that existence
of smooth solutions can be established, see the discussion in Ref. [30]. In particular, the basic
estimate for
∫ |Duk|γmk implies that the drifts DpHk entering the Fokker-Planck equations
belong to Lp(mk), where p > d + 2. It is known that this kind of Lebesgue regularity on the
drifts is strong enough to guarantee Ho¨lder bounds for mk.
Example 15. For other values of γ, we observe that V k` are uniformly bounded. Therefore, at
least in the subquadratic case (namely, when γ ≤ 2), one might exploit the classical Lipschitz
bounds for viscous HJ equations and Ho¨lder estimates for the Fokker-Planck to achieve a-priori
regularity for mk, see Ref. [40].
The setting with the costs V
k
` is more delicate, as V
k
` is a-priori unbounded in L
∞. Here,
one might reason as in Ref. [30], or Ref. [31] in the superquadratic case (see also Ref. [32]), and
finely combine regularity of the HJB equation and the Fokker-Planck equation to prove existence
of solutions of (27), at least if the space dimension is sufficiently small (d = 1, 2). We leave these
extensions to future work.
5 Numerical methods
Numerical methods for approximating mean field game systems are an important research issue
since they are crucial for applications. The finite difference methods described below are remi-
niscent ot the method first introduced and analysed in Ref. [4] for mean field games with a single
population, which, to the best of our knowledge, remains the more robust and flexible technique.
The numerical scheme basically relies on monotone approximations of the Hamiltonian and on
a suitable weak formulation of the Kolmogorov equation. It has several important features:
• existence and possibly uniqueness for the discretized problems can be obtained by similar
arguments as those used in the continuous case
• it is robust when ν → 0 (the deterministic limit of the models)
• it can be used for finite and infinite horizon problems
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• bounds on the solutions, which are uniform in the grid step, can be proved under reasonable
assumptions on the data.
A first result on the convergence to classical solutions was contained in Ref. [4]. The method was
used for planning problems (the terminal condition is a Dirichlet like condition for m) in Ref. [2].
Ref. [3] contains a further analysis of convergence to classical solutions and very general results
on the convergence to weak solutions are supplied in Ref. [5]. In Ref. [1], similar computational
techniques are applied to MFG models in macro-economics.
Discrete time, finite state space mean field games were discussed in Ref. [27]. We also refer to Ref.
[34, 35] for a specific constructive approach when the Hamiltonian is quadratic. Semi-Lagrangian
approximations were investigated in Ref. [17, 18]. Finally, augmented Lagrangian methods for
the solution of the system of equations arising from the discrete version of a variational mean
field game was proposed in Ref. [11].
5.1 Stationary PDEs
To approximate (24), we will implement the strategy proposed in Ref. [4], that consists of taking
the long-time limit of the forward-forward MFG system
∂tuk − ν∆uk +Hk(x,Duk) = V k[m1,m2](x) (0, T )× Ω
∂tmk − ν∆mk − div(DpHk(x,Duk)mk) = 0,
∂nuk = 0, ν∂nmk +mkDpH
k(x,Duk) · n = 0, (0, T )× ∂Ω
uk(t = 0) = uk,0, mk(t = 0) = mk,0, k = 1, 2.
(35)
This method is reminiscent of long-time approximations for the cell problem in homogenization
theory: we expect that there exists some λk ∈ R such that uk(·, T )− λkT and mk(·, T ) converge
as T → ∞, respectively, to some u¯k(·), m¯k(·) solving (24). Although this has not been proven
rigorously in general in the MFG setting, Gue´ant studies some single-population examples where
the coupling V (m) is not increasing with respect to the distribution m (so there is no uniqueness
of solutions, as in our framework) and justifies the approach (see Ref. [33]). Very recently, a
proof of the long-time convergence for a class of forward-forward one dimensional MFG has been
proved in Ref. [29]. We are going to present numerical experiments, even if no rigorous proof of
any convergence is available at this stage in our multi-population setting.
We mention that if the Hamiltonians Hk are quadratic, it is possible to simplify (24) through
the Hopf-Cole change of variables and reduce the number of unknowns (see Ref. [34]).
We will develop a finite-difference scheme for (35) in space dimension d = 2 as in Ref. [4],
assuming for simplicity that the Hamiltonians are of the form
Hk(x, p) = W k(x) +
1
γk
|p|γk , γk > 1, W k ∈ C2(Ω). (36)
In space dimension d 6= 2, analogous schemes can be set up. Consider a square domain
Ω = (0, 1)2, and a uniform grid with mesh step h, assuming that 1/h is an integer Nh; denote by
xi,j a generic point of the grid. Let ∆t be a positive time step and tn = n∆t. The values of uk
and mk at xi,j , tn will be approximated by U
k,n
i,j and M
k,n
i,j respectively, k = 1, 2, i, j = 1, . . . , Nh
and n ≥ 0.
We introduce the usual finite difference operators
(D+1 U)i,j =
Ui+1,j − Ui,j
h
, (D+2 U)ij =
Ui,j+1 − Ui,j
h
,
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and the numerical Hamiltonians gk : Ω× R4 → R of Godunov type defined by
gk(x, q1, q2, q3, q4) = W
k(x) +
1
γk
[
[(q1)
−]2 + [(q3)−]2 + [(q2)+]2 + [(q4)+]2
]γk/2
.
Denoting by
[DhU ]i,j = ((D
+
1 U)i,j , (D
+
1 U)i−1,j , (D
+
2 U)i,j , (D
+
2 U)i,j−1),
the finite difference approximation of the Hamiltonian function Hk will be gk(x, [DhU
k]i,j).
We choose the classical five-points discrete version of the Laplacian
(∆hU)i,j = − 1
h2
(4Ui,j − Ui+1,j − Ui−1,j − Ui,j+1 − Ui,j−1).
The non-local couplings V k[m1,m2], V
k
[m1,m2] involve terms of the form
∫
Ω
K(x, y)mk(y)dy;
we approximate them via
h2
∑
r,s
K(xi,j , xr,s)M
k,n
r,s .
On the other hand, local couplings V k` and V
k
` will be simply function evaluations at xi,j , that
is (V k` [M
1,n,M2,n])i,j = V
k
` (M
1,n
i,j ,M
2,n
i,j ).
In order to approximate the Kolmogorov equations in (35), we consider their weak formula-
tion. Given any test function φ, the divergence term involved can be rewritten as
−
∫
Ω
div(mkDpH
k(x,Duk))φ =
∫
Ω
mDpH
k(x,Duk) ·Dφ,
which is going to be approximated by (boundary terms disappear by Neumann conditions)
h2
∑
i,j
Mk,ni,j Dqg
k(x, [DhU
k,n]i,j) · [DhΦ]i,j ,
where Φ is the finite difference version of φ. By introducing the compact notation
Bki,j(U,M) =
1
h

Mi,j∂q1g
k(x, [DhU ]i,j)−Mi−1,j∂q1gk(x, [DhU ]i−1,j)
+Mi+1,j∂q2g
k(x, [DhU ]i+1,j)−Mi,j∂q2gk(x, [DhU ]i,j)
+Mi,j∂q3g
k(x, [DhU ]i,j)−Mi,j−1∂q3gk(x, [DhU ]i,j−1)
+Mi,j+1∂q4g
k(x, [DhU ]i,j+1)−Mi,j∂q4gk(x, [DhU ]i,j)
 ,
we can finally write the discrete version of (35)
Uk,n+1i,j −Uk,ni,j
∆t − ν(∆hUk,n+1)i,j + gk(x, [DhUk,n+1]i,j) = (V k[M1,n+1,M2,n+1])i,j ,
Mk,n+1i,j −Mk,ni,j
∆t − ν(∆hMk,n+1)i,j − Bki,j(Uk,n+1,Mk,n+1) = 0, k = 1, 2.
(37)
The system above has to be satisfied for internal points of the grid, i.e. 2 ≤ i, j ≤ Nh − 1. The
finite difference version of the homogeneous Neumann boundary conditions for U is, for all n, k,
Uk,n1,j = U
k,n
2,j , U
k,n
Nh−1,j = U
k,n
Nh,j
, ∀j = 2, . . . , Nh − 1
Uk,ni,1 = U
k,n
i,2 , U
k,n
i,Nh−1 = U
k,n
i,Nh
, ∀i = 2, . . . , Nh − 1
Uk,n1,1 = U
k,n
2,2 , U
k,n
Nh,1
= Uk,nNh−1,2,
Uk,n1,Nh = U
k,n
2,Nh−1, U
k,n
Nh,Nh
= Uk,nNh−1,Nh−1.
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In a similar manner, boundary conditions will be imposed on Mk,n (note that, in view of the
particular choice of the Hamiltonian, ∂nmk = 0 on the boundary); The scheme guarantees that
Mk,ni,j ≥ 0.
In Ref. [4] it is proven that (37) has a solution in the case of a single population and periodic
boundary conditions, (see Theorem 5). We expect that it is true also with Neumann boundary
conditions and two populations, since similar arguments can be used.
The present scheme is implicit, since each time iteration consists of solving a coupled system
of nonlinear equations for Uk,n+1,Mk,n+1, given Uk,n,Mk,n. This can be done for example by
means of a Newton method, increasing possibly the time step when the asymptotic regime is
close to be reached. It has been indicated in Ref. [4], Remark 11, that in order to have a good
approximation of the system of nonlinear equations, it is sufficient to perform just one step of
the Newton method: indeed, it has been observed that in general one step reduces the residual
substantially.
Finally, the discrete version of (35) that will be implemented for numerical experiments reads
Uk,n+1i,j −Uk,ni,j
∆t − ν(∆hUk,n+1)i,j + gk(x, [DhUk,n]i,j)
+Dqg(x, [DhU
k,n])i,j · ([DhUk,n+1]i,j − [DhUk,n]i,j)
= (V k[M1,n,M2,n])i,j ,
Mk,n+1i,j −Mk,ni,j
∆t − ν(∆hMk,n+1)i,j − Bki,j(Uk,n+1,Mk,n+1) = 0, k = 1, 2.
(38)
In this formulation, at each time iteration one needs to solve a coupled system of linear equations.
Note that (38) consists of an implicit scheme for the (forward) Kolmogorov equation (i.e. implicit
with respect to m and u), coupled with a linearized semi-implicit scheme for the (forward)
Hamilton-Jacobi equation (i.e. implicit with respect to u and explicit with respect to m).
We choose the initial data
Uk,0 = 0, Mk,0 = Mk0 ,
with
h2
∑
i,j
(Mk0 )i,j = 1, k = 1, 2.
We expect that there exists some real number λh,∆t, such that M
k,n and Uk,n − λh,∆tn∆t tend
to some stationary configuration as n tends to infinity.
5.2 Evolutive PDEs
The discrete scheme used for (27) is obtained by adapting the methods proposed and studied in
Ref. [4] to the multi-population case. For simplicity, let us focus on the case when the terminal
cost for the agents of type k does not depend on m(T ), so the terminal condition on uk becomes
uk(x, T ) = uk,T (x) in Ω,
and on Hamiltonians given by (36). The time-step ∆t is assumed to be of the form T/N , for a
positive integer N . Using the same notations as in § 5.1, the approximate version of (27) reads:
for any 0 ≤ n < N , 1 < i, j < Nh,
Uk,n+1i,j − Uk,ni,j
∆t
+ ν(∆hU
k,n)i,j − gk(x, [DhUk,n]i,j) = −(V k[M1,n,M2,n])i,j ,
Mk,n+1i,j −Mk,ni,j
∆t
− ν(∆hMk,n+1)i,j − Bki,j(Uk,n,Mk,n+1) = 0, k = 1, 2,
(39)
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with the initial and terminal conditions: for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Nh,
Mk,0i,j = mk,0(xi,j), U
k,N
i,j = uk,T (xi,j). (40)
It can be supplemented with discrete Neumann conditions as in § 5.1 or with periodicity condi-
tions. Note that (39) consists of a semi-implicit scheme for the (forward) Kolmogorov equation
(i.e. implicit with respect to m and explicit with respect to u) coupled with a semi-implicit
scheme for the (backward) Hamilton-Jacobi equation (i.e. implicit with respect to u and explicit
with respect to m). When dealing with one population only, it was shown in Ref. [4] that the
discrete scheme preserves the structure of the continuous problem, which makes it possible to
prove existence, and uniqueness/stability under additional assumptions. In the multi-population
case also, existence of solutions of the discrete system can be obtained by using a Brouwer
fixed point method. Then, assuming that h2
∑
i,jM
k,0
i,j = 1 for k = 1, 2, mass conservation,
i.e. h2
∑
i,jM
k,n
i,j = 1 for any n, k = 1, 2, is a consequence of the definition of Bk. Using the
monotonicity of g, we also obtain the nonnegativity of Mk,n for any n, k = 1, 2, see Ref. [4].
We briefly describe the iterative method used in order to solve (39)-(40). Since the latter system
couples forward and backward (nonlinear) equations, it cannot be solved by merely marching in
time. Assuming that the discrete Hamiltonians are C2 and the coupling functions are C1 allows
us to use a Newton-Raphson method for the whole system of nonlinear equations (which can be
huge if d ≥ 2).
More precisely, we see (39)-(40) as a fixed point problem. We first define the mapping Ξ which
maps the pair of grid functions
(
Y 1,ni,j , Y
2,n
i,j
)
i,j,n
to the pair of grid function
(
(V 1[M1,n,M2,n])i,j ,
(V 2[M1,n,M2,n])i,j
)
i,j,n
, where n takes its values in {1 . . . , N} and i, j take their values in
{1 . . . , Nh}, and (M1,ni,j ,M2,ni,j ) is found by solving the following system of discrete Bellman and
Kolmogorov equations: for any 0 ≤ n < N , 1 < i, j < Nh,
Uk,n+1i,j − Uk,ni,j
∆t
+ ν(∆hU
k,n)i,j − gk(x, [DhUk,n]i,j) = −Y k,n+1i,j ,
Mk,n+1i,j −Mk,ni,j
∆t
− ν(∆hMk,n+1)i,j − Bki,j(Uk,n,Mk,n+1) = 0,
(41)
supplemented with (40) and discrete Neumann conditions. Finding a fixed point of Ξ is equivalent
to solving (39)-(40).
Note that in (41) the discrete Bellman equations do not involve Mk,n+1. Therefore, one can first
solve the Bellman equations for Uk,n 0 ≤ n ≤ N , k = 1, 2 by marching backward in time (i.e.
performing a backward loop with respect to the index n). For every time index n, the two systems
of nonlinear equations for Uk,n, k = 1, 2 are themselves solved by means of a nested Newton-
Raphson method. Once an approximate solution of the Bellman equations has been found, one
can solve the (linear) Kolmogorov equations for Mk,n 0 ≤ n ≤ N , k = 1, 2, by marching forward
in time (i.e. performing a forward loop with respect to the index n). The solutions of (41)-(40)
are such that Mk,n are nonnegative and h2
∑
i,jM
k,n
i,j = 1 for any n, k = 1, 2.
The fixed point equation Ξ
((
Y 1,ni,j , Y
2,n
i,j
)
i,j,n
)
=
(
Y 1,ni,j , Y
2,n
i,j
)
i,j,n
is solved numerically by
using a Newton-Raphson method. This requires the differentiation of both the Bellman and
Kolmogorov equations in (41).
A good choice of an initial guess is important, as always for Newton methods. To address this
matter, we first observe that the above mentioned iterative method generally quickly converges
to a solution when the value of ν is large. This leads us to use a continuation method in the
variable ν: we start solving (39)-(40) with a rather high value of the parameter ν (of the order
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of 1), then gradually decrease ν down to the desired value, the solution found for a value of ν
being used as an initial guess for the iterative solution with the next and smaller value of ν.
6 Numerical simulations
6.1 Stationary PDEs
In this section, we will show some results obtained by implementing the long-time procedure
presented in Section 5.1. Here, we choose d = 1, Ω = (0, 1) and Hamiltonians of the form (36),
with W ≡ 0. The mesh step is h = 1/200; at each time step n we define the approximate ergodic
constant λnk = h(
∑
i U
k,n
i )/tn and the relative errors err
n
m = maxk=1,2 ‖Mk,n −Mk,n−1‖∞/∆t,
errnλ = maxk=1,2 |λnk − λn−1k |. As mentioned before, we expect that as tn grows, λnk converges to
some constant value; we stop the simulation when the two relative errors become smaller than a
fixed threshold, and denote by ukh,m
k
h the approximate solutions U
k,n,Mk,n respectively at the
last time iteration.
The initial data are set to be (unless otherwise specified)
Uk,0 ≡ 0, M1,0i = χ[0,0.5](xi), M2,0i = χ[0.5,1](xi),
while the time step is ∆t = 0.02 as long as the relative error is large, namely when errm > 1
(this happens during the first time iterations), and it is linearly increased to ∆t = 2 as soon as
the relative error errm reaches 0.001. In our simulations, stability in the long-time regime always
occurs; in Figure 3 (right) it is shown a typical behavior of the relative errors as the number of
time iterations increases.
We will show various tests with different values of H, ν, and different choices of the cost
functionals (see Table 1). Note that if ν is large (say, greater than 0.1), the constant solution
only is achieved in the long-time regime, namely Mk,n → 1 as n increases; in this situation the
mixing effect of the Brownian noise prevails on the individual preference of players. A richer
structure of approximate solutions shows up as ν approaches zero.
Table 1: The data in the tests.
Test γ ν a1 a2 Couplings
1 2 0.05, 0.0005 0.3 0.4 V`
2 2 0.05 0.4 0.8 V `, V`
3 2 0.001 0.8, 0.3 0.8, 0.3 V
4 8, 43 0.005 0.3 0.3 V`
Test 1. Here, we obtain two monotone configurations, and observe that segregation between
the two populations appears; moreover, it becomes more evident as the viscosity ν goes to zero,
see Figure 2. In other words, we find two disjoint intervals Ωk, k = 1, 2 such that m
k
h > 0 on
Ωk and m
3−k
h → 0 as ν → 0 on Ωk. Note that segregation occurs even if the two “happiness”
thresholds ak are small: the cost paid by a player can be zero even if the distribution of his own
population is less than half of the distribution of both the populations. The optimal feedback
control −Dhukh vanishes on Ωk in the small viscosity regime, because in this region the cost V k`
is identically zero; −Dhukh acts substantially only on the complement of Ωk, forcing mkh to be
close to zero.
Note that if ν is very small, the free boundary between Ω1 and Ω2 becomes a point, which
varies upon the choice of ak (see also the other tests); in general, if a1 > a2 this boundary shifts
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Figure 2: mh (left), uh (right) at different values of ν: ν = 0.05 is marked with circles, ν = 0.0005 is marked
with triangles; solid/red lines are used for (u1,m1), while dashed/blue lines are used for (u2,m2).
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Figure 3: Another configuration, ν = 0.001, with relative errors.
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closer to x = 0 if 0 ∈ Ω1, or to x = 1 if 1 ∈ Ω1: the more xenophobic population concentrates
more, while the other one is distributed over a bigger subset of the domain.
The asymptotic behavior of
∫
m1m2 dx with respect to ν appears to be power-like, that is∫
m1m2 dx ≈ cν4 for some positive c, depending on the “branch” of solutions. For this test,
numerical values can be found in Table 2.
We finally mention that if one changes the initial distributions M1,0,M2,0, then the approx-
imate solution mkh may vary; in the one dimensional case monotone configurations are likely to
occur, but it is possible to obtain solutions with more than one stationary point (see Figure 3)
by a suitable choice of Mk,0 (see also Remark 16).
Table 2: The value of
∫
m1m2 dx versus ν
ν h
∑
im
1
h,im
2
h,i
0.05 0.09100195573
0.01 0.00017126474
0.005 0.00000811663
0.0005 0.00000000068
Test 2. In this test, we show how the “family effect” affects the behavior of the two popula-
tions, and compare the approximate solutions of (24) with local couplings V ` and V`. In general,
the presence of the family effect discourages segregation, and the two distributions appear to
be a bit more “mixed” in this case, see Figure 4. Nevertheless, full segregation still occurs as ν
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Figure 4: The family effect. V `, left. V`, right.
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Figure 5: The non-local case: m1 and m2 in the subinterval [0.35, 0.65]. a1 = a2 = 0.8, left. a1 = a2 = 0.3,
right.
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approaches zero. Note that V k` is positive where m
k
h is close to zero, while V ` is proportional to
mkh: what happens is that V ` is different from zero only in a (very) small region around the free
boundary between m1, m2, that still is sufficient to trigger segregation if the viscosity is small.
Test 3. In the previous tests, we used the local versions of the costs, namely we considered
myopic players. Here, we show the results obtained considering the non-local versions of the cost
functionals as in (16), with kernel
K(x, y) =
1
|[x− δ, x+ δ] ∩ Ω|χ[x−δ,x+δ]∩Ω(y), δ ∈ (0, 1).
In Figure 5 the solutions mh are plotted; here, δ = 0.2. If a1 = a2 = 0.8, players prefer regions
of Ω with prevalent presence of their own population. In this case, one may observe that the
set where both the distributions vanish as ν → 0 is an interval with non-empty interior; this
is a consequence of the fact that the cost at position x paid by a player depends on an entire
neighbourhood of x. Nevertheless, if the happiness thresholds are sufficiently low (say, less than
0.5, as in Figure 5 (right)), the free boundary becomes a point, as in the local case V`.
Test 4. In this test, we choose different parameters for the Hamiltonians. The value of γ
affects the shape of the distributions on their support, as shown in Figure 6. Still, different values
of γ produce segregation to the same extent.
Remark 16. Numerical simulations suggest the presence of a wide variety of solutions of (24)
even in space dimension d = 1. In Ref. [21], a similar system MFG is considered, where γ = 2
and V k(m1,m2) are just increasing functions of m3−k; with respect to our models, segregation
is even more encouraged, as players aim at avoiding the other population in any case. In their
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Figure 6: The non-quadratic case. γ = 8, left. γ = 4/3, right.
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framework, some numerical phenomena arising here have been proven rigorously: existence of
branches of solutions having one ore more critical points, and segregation as ν → 0, namely∫
Ω
m1m2 → 0.
Moreover, in the vanishing viscosity limit, uniform bounds on m are shown, indicating that
concentration of the distribution is not likely to happen (therefore, anti-overcrowding terms in the
costs as in Section 2.2 might be unnecessary), and segregated configurations can be characterized
by optimal partition problems. We believe that such features of (24) can be proven also for our
Schelling models.
6.2 Evolutive PDEs
Let us discuss the numerical simulations of some finite horizon problems.
6.2.1 A one-dimensional case
Here, we choose d = 1, Ω = (−0.5, 0.5) and the horizon T = 4. The parameter ν will take the two
values 0.12 and 0.045. The value functions and the densities satisfy Neumann conditions at the
two endpoints. The Hamiltonian is H(x, p) = |p|2. The terminal cost is 0 and the coupling terms
are of the form V 1[m1,m2](x) = V(m1(x),m2(x)) and V
2[m1,m2](x) = V(m2(x),m1(x)), with
V(m,n) = Ψ−,
(
m
m+ n+ 
− 0.7
)
+ Ψ+,(m+ n− 8)
where
Ψ−,(y) =
{ −y + 2 (e y − 1) if y ≤ 0

2 (e
− y − 1) if y ≥ 0 and Ψ+,(y) =
{

2 (e
y
 − 1) if y ≤ 0
y + 2 (e
− y − 1) if y ≥ 0,
(42)
and  = 10−5. The function V is a regularized version of
V (m,n) =
(
m
m+ n
− 0.7
)−
+ (m+ n− 8)+ .
In this case, the two populations are symmetric to each other. The first part of the coupling term
stands for xenophobia: an agent located at x pays a cost if at x, the proportion of agents of its own
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type is less than 70%. The second part models the aversion to overcrowded locations: an agent
located at x pays a cost if the density of agents of both types at x is greater than 4. The initial den-
sities are m1,0(x) = 3/4 + 1/2χ[−1/2,−1/4]∪[0,1/4](x) and m2,0(x) = 3/4 + 1/2χ[−1/4,0]∪[1/4,1/2](x).
Since the initial distributions are symmetric to each other and the population have symmetric
characteristics, the distributions should remain symmetric for all times.
The spatial grid step is h = 1/50 and the time step is ∆t = 1/100.
For ν = 0.12, the evolution of the distributions of agents is displayed on Figure 7, which contains
nine snapshots corresponding to different dates between 0 and T . We easily see that the distribu-
tions of the two types of agents remain symmetric to each other. The distributions seem to keep
oscillating between two configurations in which the populations are segregated and grouped in
opposite sides of the domains. A possible explanation of this behavior may be as follows: in that
rather particular situation when the two populations are symmetric to each other and strongly
xenophobic, a rather high level of noise makes it difficult to reach a global steady equilibrium.
We expect that there exists another solution which comes close to a steady equilibrium for times
not too close to 0 and T (see the next case with ν = 0.045), but this solution has not been
selected by our numerical method.
For ν = 0.045, the evolution of the distributions is displayed on Figure 8. Here again, the two
distributions of agents remain symmetric to each other, but this time, we see that the populations
are very close to a steady equilibrium when t is not too close to 0 and T . The latter equilibrium
is a configuration in which the two populations occupy disjoint subdomains.
Figure 7: Evolution of mh for ν = 0.12: solid/red (respectively dashed/blue) lines are used for m1, (respectively
m2).
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Figure 8: Evolution of mh for ν = 0.045: solid/red (respectively dashed/blue) lines are used for m1, (respectively
m2).
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6.2.2 Two bidimensional cases
Case a) Here the domain Ω is obtained by removing a crossed-shaped set from the unit square
(−0.5, 0.5)2. We consider two types agents bound to stay in Ω, both with “threshold of happiness”
ai below 1/2. More precisely, the model is as follows: the Hamiltonians are H
1(x, p) = H2(x, p) =
|p|2. We take ν = 0.038; the value functions and the densities satisfy Neumann conditions at
∂Ω.
The terminal cost is 0 and the coupling terms are of the form
V 1 [m1,m2](x) = 2Ψ−,
(
m1(x)
m1(x) +m2(x) + 
− 0.5
)
+ Ψ+,(m1(x) +m2(x)− 8),
V 2 [m1,m2](x) = Ψ−,
(
m1(x)
m1(x) +m2(x) + 
− 0.4
)
+ Ψ+,(m1(x) +m2(x)− 8),
where Ψ−, and Ψ+, are defined in § 6.2.1 and  = 10−5. These coupling terms are regularized
versions of
V 1[m1,m2](x) = 2
(
m1(x)
m1(x) +m2(x) + 
− 0.5
)−
+ (m1(x) +m2(x)− 8)+ ,
V 2[m1,m2](x) =
(
m2(x)
m1(x) +m2(x) + 
− 0.4
)−
+ (m1(x) +m2(x)− 8)+ .
Note that the first population is less tolerant than the second one.
The agents of the first (respectively second) type are initially uniformly distributed in the top
half part (right half part) of the domain, with a density of 2. Therefore, in the top-right corner
of the domain, the two populations are initially mixed and the less tolerant agents are in an
uncomfortable state. Moreover, the cost for staying in that part of the domain is higher for the
first population of agents (by the factor 2 multiplying the term (...)−).
In the simulation, the spatial grid step is 1/64 and the time step is 1/100. The evolution of
the distributions is displayed on Figure 9: we see that the first population leaves the top-right
corner and moves toward to the top-left corner of the domain. The second population, which is
more tolerant, remains in the top-right corner, evolves in a slower manner, and tends to occupy
a larger part of the domain than the first one.
Note the Schelling’s phenomenon: segregation occurs even if both thresholds a1 = 0.5, a2 = 0.4
are not xenophobic.
Case b) Here, we consider a case when the two types of agents move in order to reach two
different targets: the strategy of the agents consists of reaching the targets while avoiding the
agents of the other population. Hence, the dynamics of the agents is not only motivated by
xenophobia.
The domain is the unit square Ω = (0, 1)2 and the horizon is T = 1.
The agents of the first (respectively second) type are initially distributed in the top-left (respec-
tively bottom-left) corner of the domain, but are attracted toward the bottom-right (respectively
top-right) corner to avoid the running costs. Therefore, the strategy of the agents will be ob-
tained as a trade-off between two opposite tendencies: on the one hand, the agents would like to
quickly reach the opposite corner, taking paths which cross each other, but on the other hand
the two populations try to avoid each other.
More precisely, the model is as follows: the Hamiltonians are
H1(x, p) = |p|2 − 1.4χ[0,0.7]×[0.2,1](x),
H2(x, p) = |p|2 − 1.4χ[0,0.7]×[0,0.8](x)),
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Figure 9: Evolution of mh for ν = 0.038: red (respectively blue) colors are used for m1, (respectively m2).
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which means in particular that the first (respectively second) type of agents is attracted to the
rectangle [0.7, 1]× [0, 0.2] (respectively [0.7, 1]× [0.8, 1]). We take ν = 0.03; the value functions
and the densities satisfy Neumann conditions at ∂Ω.
The terminal cost is 0. The coupling terms are
V 1[m1,m2](x) = 2
(
m1(x)
m1(x) +m2(x) + 
− 0.8
)−
+ (m1(x) +m2(x)− 8)+ ,
V 2[m1,m2](x) =
(
m2(x)
m1(x) +m2(x) + 
− 0.6
)−
+ (m1(x) +m2(x)− 8)+ .
The first population is more xenophobic than the second one. The initial distributions of the
agents are given by
m1,0(x) = 4χ(0,0,2)×(0.6,1) + 0.02,
m2,0(x) = 4χ(0,0,2)×(0,0.4) + 0.02.
In the simulation, the spatial grid step is 1/64 and the time step is 1/100.
The evolution of the distributions is displayed on Figure 10: we see that in the beginning (before
t = 0.2), a significant part of the first population (the more xenophobic agents) quickly moves
to the opposite corner: even if those agents pay an important cost for quickly moving to the
opposite corner, this cost is compensated by their quickly reaching a location where there are no
agents of type 2. By contrast, for t ≤ 0.2 the second population is more uniformly distributed.
At time t = 0.2, the first population is split into two groups: the first group has almost reached
the desired corner, whereas the second group has not moved. Next, for 0.2 ≤ t ≤ 0.6, this latter
group of agents of the first type still does not move, while the whole second population moves to
its favorite corner, occupying the center of the domain. Indeed, since the density of the agents
of the second type in the middle of the domain has become too important, the agents of the first
type prefer waiting rather than meeting them. At t = 0.6, most of the second population has
reached the desired corner, and the first population can finish crossing the domain.
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